Does the Origin of Normativity Stem from the Internalization of Dominance Hierarchies? by Mihailov, Emilian
© Symposion, 2, 4 (2015): 463–478 
Does the Origin of Normativity Stem  
from the Internalization  
of Dominance Hierarchies? 
Emilian Mihailov 
 
Abstract: Many natural scientists explain the evolutionary origin of morality by 
documenting altruistic behaviour in our nearest nonhuman relatives. Christine 
Korsgaard has criticized such attempts on the premise that they do not put 
enough effort in explaining the capacity to be motivated by normative thoughts. 
She speculates that normative motivation may have originated with the 
internalization of the dominance instincts. In this article I will challenge the 
dominance hierarchy hypothesis by arguing that a proper investigation into 
how and when dominance inhibits behaviour does not seem to reveal a 
minimal normative dimension. 
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Beginning with Darwin, many natural scientists have explained the evolution of 
morality as a matter of degree; specific characteristics develop from basic 
elements or from the interaction between separate processes. Darwin tentatively 
believed that moral conscience resulted from an interplay of social and cognitive 
abilities:  
Any animal whatever, endowed with well-marked social instincts, would 
inevitably acquire a moral sense or conscience as soon as its intellectual 
powers had become as well developed, or nearly as well-developed, as in man 
(Darwin 2009, 71).  
Recently, the primatologist Frans de Waal, argued along Darwinian lines, that a 
gradual evolution from sympathetic feelings to targeted helping and cognitive 
empathy:  
has provided us with the psychological makeup, tendencies, and abilities to 
develop a compass for life’s choices that takes the interests of the entire 
community into account, which is the essence of human morality (de Waal 
2006, 58).  
Natural selection has fostered sympathy and empathy because cooperation and 
sharing produces great advantages for survival and reproduction.  
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Christine Kosgaard (2010) has dubbed this naturalistic approach content 
based evolutionary explanations, because morality is defined by a characteristic 
outcome such as helping behaviour, reconciliation, loyalty, cooperation, sharing, 
empathy. Against this type of explanation, Korsgaard argues that an important 
feature of morality is ignored, namely what she calls “normative self-
government” – a capacity to be motivated and act according to what we believe 
we ought to do upon reflection (Kosgaard 1996, 2009, 2010). Human beings 
reflect upon their beliefs, have doubts and engage in an inner dialogue to figure 
out what is the right thing to do. Subsequently, such normative thoughts have 
motivational power over future action. Kosgaard explains,  
the capacity to act from what we familiarly call a sense of obligation, grounded 
in consciously held principles of good or right action. To be morally motivated 
in this sense is not just to have motives with a certain characteristic content 
(Kosgaard 2010, 6).  
She rightly points out that evolutionary accounts of morality that focus on 
prosocial behaviour (helping, avoiding aggression or refraining from inflicting 
harm) are incomplete. An origin story needs to be told about how we acquired 
the capacity to be normatively motivated. Korsgaards’s account suggests that the 
origin of normative self-government may have started with the internalization of 
mechanisms of dominance, which gave us the possibility to inhibit our 
instinctive reactions. Why should we look at dominance? Korsgaard believes that 
dominance has a normative dimension similar to authority. Where authority is 
recognised, an individual will refrain from taking an action which contravenes 
authoritarian demands or, alternatively, might perform a required action even 
without the autonomous desire to do so. 
In this article I will challenge the dominance hierarchy hypothesis. First, I 
will differentiate normative motivation from content based motivations as 
presented in Korsgaard’s evolutionary account. My argument will be premised 
on the following considerations. A proper investigation into how and when 
dominance inhibits behaviour does not seem to reveal a normative dimension of 
authority. I will make the case that dominance inhibits behaviour based on an 
imbalance of power, rather than on attaching some value to conformity per se. 
Third, I consider possible reactions to my analysis, and conclude that evidence 
from natural history about modern humans’ unique collaborative abilities points 
to a different framework as the origin of normative motivation, which, 
nevertheless, fits easily with Korsgaard’s work on practical identity. 
The Problem of Normative Motivation 
We praise and demand altruistic behaviour. People who help others and at least 
do no harm are often regarded as individuals of good moral standing. For 
example, firemen, and other emergency services, who sacrifice their lives to save 
others, or individuals living in poverty who still share their last reserves of food 
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with others in need. To be loyal, altruistic or demonstrate solidarity inspires us 
to action. 
The essential feature of human morality is therefore comprised of two 
components. One the content – the actions of morality that are praised and 
demanded and two the need to justifying one’s actions. Since early stages of 
development, children are trained to provide reasons for their actions. Parents 
often ask their children why they acted in certain ways towards other children. 
For example, when a child intentionally harms another child, they are required 
to provide answers with some justificatory force (e.g. the child who was hurt had 
instigated the fight by acting in a mean manner). At mature stages of 
development, the process of providing reasons becomes fully internalized and 
more complex. Sometimes we manage to stop at the brink of taking action to ask 
ourselves if this is really what we ought to be doing and whether our motives are 
the correct ones.  
In his famous derivation of the duty against false promising, Kant suggests 
the thought process that takes place in such reflective moments:  
Another sees himself pressured by need to borrow money. He knows full well 
that he will not be able to repay, but also sees that nothing will be lent to him 
unless he solemnly promises to repay it at a determinate time. He feels like 
making such a promise; but he still has enough conscience to ask himself: is it 
not impermissible and contrary to duty to help oneself out of need in such a 
way? (Kant 2011, 4:422).  
By the term “enough conscience” Kant means there is a moral baseline which 
functions as a measure for when actions digress. The agent is pulled by his 
inclinations to make false promises, but at the same time his consciousness 
signals that the course of action is not the appropriate one. It is this awareness 
that initiates a process of normative reflection. 
The process of taking a “reflective distance” from the motive of action, 
followed by normative questioning, is defined as a capacity for normative self-
government (Korsgaard 2010, 18). The ability to take a reflective distance gives 
rise to the need to justify actions because we are able to raise normative 
questions, in the same way that the subject does from Kant’s story. When I am 
aware that a lack of material resources pushes me to make false promises, I am 
still able to question my actions and ask whether it is morally justified. The 
answers to such questions constitute the normative making features that 
motivate us to avoid false promises. In line with this, Korsgaard’s point is that  
what makes some actions required and some wrong must also be the source of 
our motivation for doing and avoiding them accordingly (Korsgaard 2010, 15). 
This approach implies that moral motivation cannot rest only on 
sympathetic feelings. I may feel sympathy towards someone and, consequently, 
relieve his distress. However, if I am not moved to action by what makes it a 
required action, without further intervening factors, I am not normatively 
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motivated. Therefore, to be normatively motivated one must recognize that right 
making features have authority over us as rational beings. This is what Kant 
called the “authority of the moral law” (5: 38). It is the value we attach to 
respecting what the moral law demands from us. In military organizations, one 
has to obey orders from superiors because this is required by the nature of the 
hierarchic order. Recognizing the authority invested in superior positions makes 
people respect and conform to orders. In some cases, orders might not make 
complete sense or we might not agree with the individuals who issue them but 
they are still obeyed because we accept that orders, in certain situations, have to 
be respected outright. Thus, when we are normatively motivated we presuppose 
that the right making features of an action have the authority to guide our 
behaviour and that respect for what authority demands is the appropriate 
course. Korsgaard contends that this is a unique feature of human moral 
motivation which needs evolutionary explanation, alongside the natural history 
of solidarity/cooperation and altruistic behaviour. 
Korsgaard’s Origin Story of Normative Self-Government 
How did we become normatively governed animals? Korsgaard suggests that a 
constant effort to inhibit our instinctive responses, to be aggressive against our 
own instincts, has led to an increase in mental capability, which grew into a new 
form of self-consciousness, namely the awareness of how our mental activity 
contributes to perceiving the world. Here, the capacity for normative self-
government becomes the solution to the need for justification posed by the 
awareness of our potential motives for action. This is explained fully in the 
following paragraphs. 
Korsgaard relies on theories offered by Nietzsche and Freud to suggest 
how the control over instincts might have originated. Both Nietzsche (1967) and 
Freud (1950, 1961) believed that guilt is not just a feeling that signals wrongness 
of behaviour, but a dark psychological mechanism which springs from our 
aggressive nature to hurt ourselves when we cannot hurt others. Once 
aggression is turned against our instincts, an interesting psychological structure 
emerges that allows us to forgo some of the strongest behavioural causes.  
What is important for Korsgaard in Nietzsche and Freud’s reflections is the 
formal structure of behaviour which allows mental activity to inhibit instinctive 
responses. Reflecting on the natural science of social animals, Korsgaard fills in 
this structure with the dominance hierarchy hypothesis to explain how mental 
controls may have formed. A dominance hierarchy among social animals is an 
advantageous evolutionary strategy to reduce fatal conflicts. Animals do not 
have to fight each time for food, water or mating partners if there is an 
established hierarchy which informs the group who is first in line to benefit any 
of the resources available. When an animal dominates a rival in singular or 
reiterated encounters a relationship of superiority is established for future 
interaction. If the dominated animal manages to control his impulses, he has 
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more chances to avoid potential troubles. Thus, it becomes possible to avoid 
fighting each time when there is competition (both want the same resource). For 
examples, high ranking chimpanzees do not only dominate weaker individuals in 
conflicts over food or mating partners, they also intervene and settle conflicts 
that disturb the whole group; they do policing work and control the social 
dynamics of the group, sometimes even setting aside social ties (de Waal 2014). 
Korsgaard takes interest in dominance hierarchies because it seems to 
have a normative dimension:  
I think that such dominance is interesting in this context, because dominance 
looks a lot like something that we think of as essentially normative: it looks like 
authority (Korsgaard 2010, 20).  
She explains that what makes a dominated animal refrain from doing something 
that it needs or desires is not because the circumstances are unfavourable to the 
outcome of the action – for example when the animal is outnumbered by 
competition – but rather because avoiding a specific course of action is required 
due to his place in the group hierarchy. The fact that a low ranked animal 
recognizes the standing of a high ranked animal in itself inhibits the instinctive 
responses. It is not necessary for the dominating animal to send threat signals to 
the dominated animal in order for the latter to be submissive. Korsgaard points 
out that  
in some animals dominance hierarchies can be inherited and apparently go 
unchallenged for longish stretches of time (Korsgaard 2010, 20).  
In such cases, the use of aggression is not necessary to maintain hierarchies. 
We observe that authority based motivation seems to share an important 
feature of normative motivations – the intrinsic value that makes an action right 
also motivates that action, without any intervening mechanism. Similarly, 
authoritarian dominance determines the prohibition of an action and, at the 
same time, constitutes a source of motivation for avoiding that action, without 
the use of aggression. Animals in dominance hierarchies are motivated to avoid 
certain actions by ways of status recognition. This is why Korsgaard believes that 
fear of consequences does not always play a role in status recognition as an 
inhibitory mechanism. She argues, for instance, that when a pet dog is trained 
and controlled successfully, the nature of this relationship is not based on fear. 
The dog submits to commands not because he is afraid, but because he 
recognizes a relationship in which he is supposed to follow orders. The 
acknowledged dominance is the main motivation for the dog’s submission. 
Established relationships in dominance hierarchies seem to motivate by 
themselves the actions which should be avoided, without involving directly 
prudential calculations. To a certain extent it influences behaviour 
independently of desires or prudential rationality. According to Korsgaard, 
dominance based authority has a normative dimension because it is not always 
established, maintained and transmitted by use of punishment, and because fear 
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of consequences does not always play a motivational role. Mainly, the 
recognition of a relationship in which an animal dominates others seems to 
motivate them to override their instincts.  
Korsgaard suggests that normative self-government through a mechanism 
of dominance may have originated as an inhibitory system. This, she argues, is 
independent from direct cost-benefit calculation:  
we began to become rational animals when we began, as individuals, to exert a 
kind of dominance over ourselves – to inhibit our own instinctive responses 
(Korsgaard 2010, 21).  
The manner in which we began to exert restrictions over our own actions must 
be a significant one because not every instinct control mechanism has been 
overcome by mental activity. When a hungry animal sees prey he does not 
immediately attack, but rather plans his moves and waits for a good chance to be 
successful. On many occasions youngsters may spoil food opportunities, yet as 
they gain experience in controlling their reactions success will come about. Short 
term planning, thus, is not possible without some behavioural sensitisation. 
However, in order to make the transition to rationality, a more ambitious mental 
control is needed. Korsgaard believes that controlling our actions by internal 
guidance of status recognition may have the potential to put significant pressure 
on a much wider range of instinctive responses, producing important changes in 
our mental activity resulting in a general takeover.  
In concurrence with Nietzsche, she contends that the process of 
controlling our instincts independently of threats, fear of consequences or 
desires, is linked with a development of mental activity, or as she puts it with “a 
kind of deepening of consciousness itself” (Korsgaard 2010, 21). In order to take 
place, the process of internalization needs more mental abilities than the mere 
inhibition generated by fear of consequences. So, we can imagine that dominance 
hierarchies create an authority based inhibitory system that overtime expands 
mental activity, perhaps in order to conform to more easily. 
Do Dominance Hierarchies Have a Normative Dimension? 
In what follows my analysis does not aim to question Korsgaard’s general 
speculation that internalized authority may have led to a general takeover over 
our mental life, but rather to challenge how she instantiates the general 
speculation by appealing to the dominance hierarchy hypothesis. I will provide 
details of how dominance hierarchies are learned, established and maintained, 
which are in tension with Korsgaard’s description of the inhibitory system 
involved in recognizing dominance. 
An experiment was carried out with Rhesus monkeys. To start the 
monkeys went without water for three hours, when later provided with water 
they drank in hierarchical order (de Waal 1993), behavioural data suggests an 
elusive normative dimension inspired by hierarchical dominance. It has been 
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shown that in circumstances where resources are limited, and where one might 
expect the rational survival behaviour to disobey hierarchies, rhesus monkeys 
continue to act in conformity with a dominance order. However, a closer look at 
the documented behaviour of primates will reveal that hierarchical dominance 
does not look like the authority that marks the inception of normative 
motivation. 
Dominance hierarchies are an evolutionary response to manage 
competition for limited resources and mating partners, having the function to 
reduce costly aggression. Coe and Rosenblum (1984) designed an experiment to 
see how dominance influences sexual behaviour in low-ranking macaques and 
other primates. They set up two conditions, one in which the alpha male had 
visibility over the group but was kept in a transparent box, and another in which 
the alpha male was removed from the premises. In the first condition, low-
ranking males kept the distance from females even though the alpha male was 
confined to a box, indicating that, despite the possibility to mate without any 
short term costs, low-ranking males were guided by hierarchic order. However, 
as soon as the alpha male was removed from the premises, the same males 
immediately approached the females and began copulating. It is also reported 
that when reuniting with the alpha male the low-ranking males greeted him with 
wide submissive teeth-baring. Coe and Rosenblum take this to suggest an 
implicit recognition of social code violation. Nevertheless, such an interpretation 
is ambitious. The submissive gesture might indicate a willingness to endure 
aggression in exchange for reduced punishment. The possibility of being seen, 
even if the alpha male is absent, should be taken into account by the strategy of 
submissiveness, which signals to the potential aggressor that there will be no 
retaliation in the face of punishment. The alpha male might be satisfied with 
scaling down punishment if there are no costs for retaliation. Even if we grant 
the interpretation that the submissive gesture is an implicit recognition of social 
code violation, it does not follow that the violation of hierarchic order per se 
triggers remorse or guilt feelings. It might be other factors, such as fear of 
consequences, anxiety of uncertain outcomes or possible damages to valuable 
relationships play a role in submissive behaviour in the context of social code 
violation. Obedience can function as a precautionary declaration of peace or as a 
disposition to settle potential conflicts at minimum costs. 
In several studies of “guilty-looking” behaviour in dogs after violation of 
human imposed rules, it has been documented that beyond the effect of direct 
human behaviour there is no sign of rule internalization (Vollmer 1977; 
Horowitz 2009). Prohibitions do not trigger any psychological disturbance for 
dogs when there is no direct human consequence. Others report studies show 
more cunning “disobedience” in the face of hierarchic order (Tomasello and Call 
1997). For example, in one investigation, a female baboon ingeniously managed 
to deceive an alpha male in order to groom with a subdominant male. In spite of 
the fact that the alpha male had visibility, which involves high risks of severe 
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punishment, she slid her body behind a boulder in a way that only her head was 
within sight of the alpha male. In that position, the female began to groom with 
the subdominant male. This shows that submission to hierarchic order is 
conditioned to the presence or absence of dominant individuals.  
Korsgaard claims that dominance is not always established by aggression 
arguing that  
in some animals dominance hierarchies can be inherited and apparently go 
unchallenged for longish stretches of time (Korsgaard 2010, 20).  
It seems that in such cases it is not the fear of consequences that guides the 
behaviour of a dominated animal but the recognition of the standing of another 
animal. This recognition is what makes the dominated animal to inhibit the 
course of action he would otherwise pursue. While aspects of this are true, 
Korsgaard’s claim is an overstatement about how dominance hierarchies can be 
maintained. Status recognition does motivate the inhibition of instincts, but 
more needs to be said about how the standing itself of the dominant animal is 
established and maintained. What do dominated animals actually recognize in 
the standing of a dominating animal? 
The rank in a hierarchic order is established primarily by domination 
through physiological size and strength, and it is learned and enforced by 
punishment and exclusion (Aunger and Curtis 2015; de Waal 2014). The 
dominance-subordination relationship is, therefore, characterised by an 
asymmetric distribution of power (Preuschoft and van Schaik 2000, 78). Juvenile 
rhesus monkeys and apes, for instance, ignore the hierarchic order until their 
third or fourth year of life, and only learn the rank order afterwards, mainly 
through punishment. Frans de Waal reports that the rank order is forcefully 
established for youngsters with dramatic punishments especially when they 
dare to approach sexually attractive females: 
Young males need only one or two such lessons. From then on, every adult male 
can make them jump away from a female by a mere glance or step forward (de 
Waal 2014, 189, 53)  
After severe punishment, it is enough for young males to sense threat signals in 
order to control their sexual drive, which shows that fear of consequences for 
disrupting the rank order is the main effective inhibitor of instinctive reactions. 
Thus, punishment and aggression must be at the heart of dominance hierarchy if 
it is to be maintained and transmitted to younger generations. Moreover, the 
preservation of social order is dependent on the presence of powerful alpha 
males. Flack and her colleagues (2005) show that temporary removal of 
powerful conflict managers generates group destabilization, defined as increased 
levels of conflict and decreased positive interaction.  
Korsgaard also overstates her claim when she says that hierarchic orders 
may go unchallenged for longer periods of time, implying that the hierarchy by 
itself will keep defectors at distance without other intervening mechanisms. 
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Again, more needs to be said to understand the social dynamics involved in 
maintaining the overall ranking order and what is behind the decision not to 
challenge dominance orders. Indeed, it is part of the dominance order to be an 
evolutionary stable strategy that reduces the costs of social contests for access to 
resources (Cummins 2006). It is expected not to be challenged constantly since 
everyone wins something even if only a few get the biggest prize. However, 
attention to the detail of how dominance hierarchies are secured and challenged 
will throw some light on to the kind of authority that is at play.  
Dominant primate males must first obtain their status by a means of 
aggression and establish decisively the asymmetry of power to demonstrate that 
their rank can be defended. If the asymmetry of power is not clearly secured, the 
new status is hard to defend, becoming more vulnerable to challenges. This is 
why alpha males, even after establishing their rank, continue to communicate 
their power superiority and seek to gain the support of the group. It has been 
observed that high ranking males constantly perform the typical bouncing 
displays of high-status, they signal fighting abilities and show off (de Waal 2014, 
Aunger and Curtis 2015). The asymmetry of power provides opportunities to 
successfully maintain the rank order. Winners of past contests tend to escalate 
conflicts, whereas losers are less likely to do so, securing the hierarchy by a 
reinforcement mechanism (Aunger and Curtis 2015, 57). When an animal has 
power superiority he will be more willing to engage in conflicts which easily 
confirm his status. The more confirmations, the more positions of standing are 
entrenched and will be acknowledged and accepted within groups. Thus, the 
occurrence of conflicts favours dominant individuals because they gain leverage 
to reinforce and advance the existing rank order. We may say that this puts 
dominant individuals in a “virtuous” circle and dominated ones in a “vicious” one. 
Those who hold dominant positions also get involved in third parties 
fights, providing further opportunities to reinforce hierarchy positions by 
exerting dominance. For example, high-ranking male chimpanzees often 
intervene to stop fights or to reduce the level of aggression among group 
members (de Waal 2014). By virtue of power superiority, dominant individuals 
acquire the reputation of effective conflict managers requiring others to ask for 
their intervention. When in-group conflicts escalate, bystanders inform the alpha 
male and ask for his intervention to control the situation (de Waal 2014). These 
are further opportunities to perfectly demonstrate that dominance has been well 
established, although in such situations the benefits are distributed across the 
group by maintaining social harmony. If a dominant individual is able to keep 
social harmony then the group has an additional interest to accept the existing 
hierarchic order.  
Dominant individuals also try to win the support of the group by social 
measures, which can be less costly than direct aggressive measures. Apes have a 
preference to interact with those individuals who manifest positive attitudes (de 
Waal 2014). This implies that the group will prefer “good guys” over “bullies.” 
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There are mainly two types of dominant individuals among hierarchic orders in 
primates: aggressive dominants and group leaders (de Waal 1989). Aggressive 
dominants have a bullying profile, harassing others without justification, 
whereas leaders do not use force immediately, choosing first rather to send 
warning signals. Also, leader dominance tends to calm things down after fights 
through the use of calm gestures and reconciliation. De Waal emphasises that “it 
is these diplomatic dominants who enjoy popularity, not the bullies” (de Waal 
1989, 253). Since the group’s support (for a leader) is also fostered by pro-social 
means, dominants have incentives to take into consideration such attitudes, at 
least when it contributes to the acknowledgement of their position in the overall 
ranking. 
Because a hierarchic order determines the priority of access to resources, 
it becomes attractive to conserve and improve one’s status. Thus, status 
motivates individuals to improve their social position in order to have priority of 
access to resources (Aunger and Curtis 2015, 58). Low ranking individuals will 
seek to enhance their position, whereas high ranking will seek to maintain the 
status quo and to monitor it. This develops into informal challenges and tactics. 
Low ranking individuals will make targeted contributions to their social group 
and draw attention to these contributions, submit more easily to authority or 
join dominant aggressors against other subordinate individuals (Aunger and 
Curtis 2015, 58; Preuschoft and van Schaik 2000, 88), while high ranking 
individuals will monitor closely the dynamics of power, form coalitions, alliances 
and opportunistic reconciliations (de Waal 1989, Preuschoft and van Schaik 
2000).1 
Once we identify the challenges and tactics occuring at the high end of the 
hierarchy, it becomes clearer that hierarchic authority is vulnerable to struggles 
for power because the asymmetry – superior or inferior – is not a stabled fix 
position. Frans de Waal suggests possible rank challenges at the high end of the 
hierarchy in a chimpanzee colony (de Waal 1989, 20). In one observation the 
group was dominated for a long time by a coalition of two adult males, Nikkie 
and Yeroen. Nikkie was more powerful, but Yeroen had more experience in 
power games. Nikkie managed to become leader and maintained the position 
with the help of Yeroen. However, this placed him in a relationship of 
dependency for he could not defend on his own the dominant status. As long as 
their relationship was harmonious, they could easily enforce the rank order, 
nevertheless when they fought each other third party challenges emerged. While 
Nikkie and Yeroen were chasing each other, a third male, Luit, made his move of 
claiming dominance by “spectacular intimidation displays, hooting with his hair 
on end and hurling stones and branches in every direction” (de Waal 1989, 21). 
Luit continued to terrorize the females and show off closer and closer to the two 
                                                        
1 Low ranked individuals are interested in power dynamics and take part in forming coalitions 
but their position hardly allows them to lead the effort.  
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dominant males. When Nikkie felt that the challenge was quite serious he started 
to make reconciliatory gestures to Yeroen, by stretching his hand with a broad 
nervous grin on his face. As soon as Yeroen accepted to make up, Nikkie went to 
reinforce his position in front the rival by performing a display of dominance. In 
return, Luit responded with submissive behaviour, acknowledging Nikkie’s 
continued dominant status.  
This story about complicated group relationships deeply illustrates that 
hierarchic orders will be challenged if the asymmetry of power between 
dominant and subordinate individuals is narrow enough for potential candidates 
to have a chance of overturning the group ranking. Competition for status in the 
overall ranking of a group is pervasive in primate societies. Subordinates are 
opportunists who will use any unbalance in power relationships (Chapais 1992, 
1995). On the other side, the reason why most of the time hierarchic orders will 
go unchallenged is that the asymmetry of power between dominants and 
subordinates is too wide for rivals to even begin considering the possibility of 
reshaping the group ranking. Dominance hierarchies are most secure over time 
when there are no changes in individual or coalition strength (Preuschoft and 
van Schaik 2000, 87).  
By reflecting on the way dominance hierarchies are learned, established 
and maintained, I have suggested that this is not consistent with Korsgaard’s 
picture of how dominance motivates behaviour. Indeed, dominance is not always 
established by aggression and hierarchies may go unchallenged for long periods 
of time. This does not suggest that this behaviour is motivated by mere 
recognition of a hierarchic relationship. A closer look at the documented 
behaviour in social settings of dominance hierarchies tells another story. 
Submission to authority in dominance hierarchies takes place in the presence 
but not in the absence of dominance, which implies that the effect of status 
recognition on instinct inhibition is drastically limited to direct visibility and 
monitoring. The hierarchic order succeeds in keeping defectors in line when 
dominant figures are in a position to monitor group interactions. But when 
dominant positions have no direct visibility or social interaction subordinates 
transgress rank prohibitions, and the social order may even break down. So, it 
appears that the presence of high rank individuals is the glue for conformity to 
hierarchy and maintaining social order, implying that status recognition is mixed 
with the acknowledgement of potential aggression. The essential mechanism of 
establishing dominance is through exerting and communicating fighting abilities. 
Hierarchic order is mainly learned and enforced by punishment, threats of 
punishment, exclusions and escalation of aggressiveness because it is ultimately 
based on fighting abilities. Where aggression is not used, dominants capitalize 
opportunities to strengthen their position, gaining group support through 
prosocial behaviour and conflict management. Regarding the maintenance of 
hierarchy, Korsgaard is right that it can go unchallenged for a long period of time, 
but it is misleading if she associates this to prohibitions and concludes rank 
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order has sufficient authority alone to discourage disruptions. The main two 
reasons why dominance hierarchies go unchallenged for long periods of time is 
because of the wide asymmetry of power between dominants and subordinates 
and lack of changes in individual or coalition strength. When strength 
superiority is ambiguous, hierarchies are seriously vulnerable to power shifts.  
All this suggests that the dominance does not have the features that 
Korsgaard expects to have. Dominance functions as an inhibition system limited 
to direct encounters and monitoring. As soon as direct monitoring lacks or can 
easily be avoided, self-inhibition breaks down. I am not claiming that dominance 
did not contribute to a better control of mental activity. It may have increased 
the capacity of self-control to a certain extent and made behaviour more flexible 
in the face of instinctive reactions or, as others claim, formation of hierarchies in 
primates may have been an emergent property of individual behavioural rules 
(Aunger and Curtis 2015). Also, submissive behaviour facilitates rule following. 
However, what I am claiming is that a proper understanding of documented 
behaviour in dominance hierarchies suggests that the internalization of 
dominance is not an appealing starting point to explain the origin of normative 
motivation. Once individuals are presented with opportunities for defection, 
dominance loses its motivational power. This contrasts with the fundamental 
feature of internal normative guidance which is much more independent from 
prudential reasoning when situations present advantages with small costs of 
breaking the rules. Animals in hierarchic orders are still opportunists who will 
attend their instincts when “authority” is not around. Moreover, without the 
dominants’ superiority to impose sanctions, hierarchic orders are vulnerable. 
The authority inspired by dominance hierarchies evaporates when there is no 
direct control and no clear power asymmetry.  
Korsgaard might reply that after all her speculation is that dominance 
hierarchies contain only the thing that becomes one’s authority over oneself once 
it is internalized, not that the dominance hierarchy embodies a genuine form of 
normativity or authority. However, Korsgaard needs to explain why she chosen 
dominance authority. What is so special about inherent features of dominance 
that once they are internalized it becomes an authority over us? The answer 
would still have to face the conclusions of my analysis because there must be a 
close connection between the inherent features of dominance that once they are 
internalized it becomes an authority over us and germinal forms of normative 
motivation. If there is no close connection then it is not clear what features can 
become an authority over us once they are internalized. Kosgaard herself says 
that dominance is interesting because it is similar to normative authority. 
Further, she could say that the kind of internalization which is at the origin 
of normative motivation is more extended in scope and range, so that behaviour 
will normally conform to rank order even in the absence of high-ranking 
individuals and inarticulate power superiority. This is a deeper internalization of 
dominance based authority which indeed could be a source of normative 
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motivation. But one has to ask how this fits with natural history. The transition 
from primates to homo species marked a significant shift in group structure and 
resource allocation. The rise of early humans produced profound shifts in 
behavioural patterns and cognitive abilities, previously unseen in primates. It is 
unlikely that the internalization of dominance based authority has expanded, 
because early humans experimented with new ways of social interaction.2  
It is documented that homo sapiens had an egalitarian social order, and it 
is likely that dominance hierarchies may have been wore away already by 
hominids (Boehm 1999). The specific feeding ecology of foraging caused humans 
to adopt highly collaborative strategies, creating an interdependence which is 
unprecedented in the primate order (Tomasello and Vaish 2013). The profound 
changes in how individuals collaborate levelled the playing field, thus, tempering 
the competitive mental setup which is the framework in which dominance 
hierarchies emerge.3 There is conclusive evidence that modern humans have 
unique levels of cooperation, collaboration and social cognition (Tomasello 2009, 
2014). These highly developed behavioural repertoires are, among others, the 
building blocks of human uniqueness. So, it seems more appealing to look in this 
direction for the origin of normative motivation. For example, Philip Kitcher 
(2011) has argued that the only available source of genuine normative guidance 
is the practice of group members to discuss and formulate commands. Whilst, 
Michael Tomasello (2014) proposes that collective intentionality, which lacks in 
primates, may have led to normative self-governance.4 Collective intentionality 
has pushed individuals to think of themselves as group members with a 
particular group identity. This group-mindedness has led to collective moral 
expectations that motivate behaviour towards group members.  
Interesting enough, Korsgaard’s work on the meta-ethical sources of 
normativity fit with this approach. Her claim is that ultimately the source of 
normative reasons is what she calls practical identities, defined as a set of 
normative standards of “dos and don’ts” (Korsgaard 2009, 21). For example, the 
practical identity of motherhood contains what mothers should do in order to 
fulfil their role. Similarly, we can imagine that group identities specified the “dos 
and don’ts” which were internalized more deeply once individuals identified 
themselves with the group. It seems to me that it is more natural for Korsgaard 
                                                        
2 Because early human were not significantly dismorphic, this can be taken as additional 
evidence for dropping out dominance hierarchies due to the fact that dimorphism favours 
dominance hierarchies (Coolidge & Wynn 2009, 90)  
3 I suspect that this might be a deeper issue for Korsgaard’s proposal, but I will not develop 
here. The fact that dominance hierarchies are responses to problems in competitive settings 
may be a decisive reason why mental activity control has not developed more in the direction 
of becoming less opportunistic.  
4 In his account of the origin of normative thinking, Tomasello makes reference to Korsgaard’s 
meta-ethical work on normative self-governance. See also Tomasello and Vaish (2013). 
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to look at the dynamics of collaborative expectations and commitments for the 
origin of normative motivation. 
Conclusion 
Korsgaard’s insistence that there is more to morality than its specific content has 
significant merits to developing a more complete outlook of the origin of 
morality. Independent of morally good motives, which spring from sympathy 
with others’ conditions, the capacity to govern ourselves in accordance with 
what we believe we ought to do for its own sake is also central to human 
morality. Korsgaard proposes that dominance has a normative dimension 
because it looks like authority. I have argued that a closer look at the 
documented behaviour in social settings of rank order reveals that dominance 
does not contain the features which are relevant for normative authority. 
Dominance inhibits instinctive reactions without being exercised each time, but 
it fails to guide behaviour beyond its presence, communication of strength and 
clear power superiority. We must look for authority somewhere else if 
Korsgaard’s speculation is to become more robust.5 
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